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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000037

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SUBJECT: Somalia - New TFG Police Chief Describes Organizational  
Efforts in Mogadishu

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Patterson, Counselor for Somalia Affairs, State  
Department, Somalia Unit; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

Summary

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11. (C) Summary: Somalia Unit contractor met with the recently-appointed TFG Chief of Police Loyan on January 9. (Note: Loyan replaced warlord "Qeybdiid" as police chief on December 6, 2009.) Loyan made a good impression. He seemed to have a good sense both of the problems he faced and a strategy for addressing them. As has been the case with the military forces, the major problem was ensuring the regular payment of stipends to his police force. Loyan was in Nairobi to discuss payment of stipends with UNDP.

12. (C) Summary continued: In his review of the current state of the TFG police, Loyan noted:

\* That there are approximately 1000 police cadets, all recruited from the Gedo and Lower Juba region, in a German-funded training program in Ethiopia. The Germans had agreed to pay stipends for one year after the return of the trainees to Somalia. Since the program began under his predecessor, Loyan knew little more about the training program. (Note: Somalia Unit is putting Loyan in touch with a colleague at the German Embassy.)

\* Four hundred police trained in Armo (Puntland) are in Mogadishu and awaiting uniforms, which are reportedly in a UNDP warehouse. Loyan was in Nairobi to address this problem, as well.

\* Police forces formerly loyal to former Police Commissioner "Qeybdiid" have been ordered to surrender their "technicals" to the Army as part of Loyan's effort to distinguish the military from the TFG's police forces. Loyan has also relieved two senior staff as part of his re-organization effort.

\* The TFG controls eight of the sixteen police stations in Mogadishu. The remainder are controlled by al-Shabaab.

\* Both Loyan and Army Chief of Staff Gelle agree that neither the police, nor the army is ready to launch an offensive in Mogadishu. Both are resisting efforts by TFG "politicians" to begin what they see as a premature effort to take control of Mogadishu. Both believe that TFG forces will be ready within four to six weeks.

\* There are no active TFG police elements outside Mogadishu, but former police officers in the countryside provide information when asked. End summary.

#### Biographical Note

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13. (SBU) Somalia Unit contractor met with recently-appointed Police Commissioner Ali Mohammed Hassan Loyan "Madobe" on January 19. Loyan was well-spoken, and well-aware of the problems he faced, but credibly confident that they could be solved. Before replacing warlord "Qeybdiid" as Commissioner on December 6, 2009,

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Loyan since 2007 had been the TFG's Ambassador to Tanzania. Loyan was Somalia's Chief of Counterintelligence from 1983 - 1989. He lived in The Netherlands from 1996 - 2005.

#### Paycheck the Main Problem

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14. (C) As is the case with the security forces and the rest of the TFG, the major problem confronting the police is the lack of a steady paycheck. Loyan was in Nairobi in an effort to untangle the longstanding UNDP - European Commission inability to make good on their commitment to pay at least part of the force, and to lobby for expansion of the payment program. (Note: Strenuous efforts have been made by UNPOS to force a resolution of the failure to provide timely payments to the registered police. Although there is a commitment to pay, regular payments of the police force have not begun.)

15. (C) In a subsequent, brief meeting with Poloff after meeting with UNDP, Loyan reported that UNDP was in principle ready to release payments to the police for calendar year 2008, but that it continued to insist that it would pay only the initial group of 2800 police, leaving the remainder to the TFG. The dilemma remained the same, Loyan noted. He could not pay only part of the force without creating unrest.

#### Standardizing Training, Regularizing the Forces

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16. (C) Loyan knew little about the curriculum used in training TFG police outside the country. He hoped to standardize the individual efforts of training countries, and tailor them better to conditions in Somalia.

¶17. (C) Loyan noted that there were approximately 1000 cadets from Gedo and Lower Juba regions engaged in German-funded training in Ethiopia. Loyan lamented the fact that the German initiative was being done through the AU, and was not being coordinated with the TFG. He suspected that the training was paramilitary, but was disguised as police training in order to permit German funding. (One bright note: Loyan reported that the Germans had agreed to pay stipends for one year upon the cadets' return to Somalia.) Loyan was not certain where the Gedo/LowerJuba cadets would return to, and who would command them on return. (Note: Somalia Unit has provided a German colleague with Loyan's contact numbers and urged closer cooperation with the TFG as this effort progresses.)

¶18. (C) In addition to the cadets in Ethiopia, Loyan reported that about five hundred recruits were to be moved to Armo (Puntland) and an additional five hundred to Djibouti for UNDP-sponsored police training. Meanwhile, four hundred cadets who have completed training in Armo are currently idle at the Mogadishu Police Academy. Delaying their deployment is a lack of uniforms, which Loyan thought were in a UNDP warehouse in Nairobi. He was pressing UNDP for their delivery to Mogadishu.

¶19. (C) In an effort to separate the police from the TFG security forces, Loyan had ordered police loyal to former Police Commissioner "Qeybdiid" to surrender their "technicals" to the Army. He had dismissed two senior police staff, Generals Bashir

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and John, as part of his re-organization of the force. Handicapping Loyan's efforts to re-organize his force was a continued inability to pay "Qeybdiid's" clan-based police. (Note: those forces have not undergone UNDP-approved training and therefore are not eligible for payment by UNDP.) He thought that "Qeybdiid's" police force numbered about 1,500.

¶10. (C) In an effort to weaken clan allegiances, Loyan intended to re-train the police force currently at the seaport and, while they were in training, replace them with a force with a more diverse clan make-up. Next, he planned to disburse the force currently at the port throughout the city in order to further dilute clan influences.

¶11. (C) Loyan reported that seven Somalis who have received a year of professional military training in Uganda and have been commissioned as lieutenants are providing training to the police and the army in Mogadishu.

¶12. (C) The TFG currently controls eight of the sixteen police stations in Mogadishu. Each TFG-controlled police station is supplied with two light machine guns. Al-Shabaab controls the remaining eight stations. The TFG has no police presence outside Mogadishu, but ex-police officers provide information about developments when asked to do so.

Coordination Within the TFG Improving

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¶13. (C) Although not happy with communications with the

international community, Loyan thought that coordination within the TFG, and with AMISOM, was improving. He described working relations with Army Chief of Staff Mohammed Gelle "Kahiye" and with TFG President Sharif as "very good." They all live in Villa Somalia, Loyan said, and they talk daily. He was also in daily contact with National Security Agency Chief Mohammed Sheikh.

¶14. (C) Loyan's relations with TFG ministers are not as close, as they are not co-located.

¶15. (C) The period of mistrust that had followed the September 17, 2009, suicide attack on AMISOM had dissipated, Loyan thought. He believed that coordination with AMISOM Commander Mugisha had improved. The TFG was planning to precede its long-advertised offensive in Mogadishu with a joint exercise with AMISOM.

New Chief-of-Staff Improving Military,  
But Battle for Mogadishu Only in Four -  
Six Weeks

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¶16. (C) Loyan said that Army Chief-of-Staff Gelle and he agreed that neither the army nor the police are at present prepared to launch an offensive in Mogadishu. Both have been advising TFG "politicians" not to act too hastily. Loyan thought that the logistics were not yet in place to sustain the planned offensive.

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Field rations, medical kits, water, and other supplies needed to be either pre-positioned or prepared to be moved before a successful push against al-Shabaab could be undertaken. He suspected that the forces would not be battle ready for four to six weeks.

¶17. (C) In the interim, Gelle was re-structuring the TFG army, with a goal of forming one brigade of about 1,800 troops. The appointment of officers and NCOs was progressing, and additional training for former Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) soldiers and trainees returning from abroad was underway. The 500-man Navy were being re-trained as light infantry and were to be incorporated into the Jazeera brigade. (Note: The Jazeera brigade comprises troops trained recently in Djibouti and Barre-era troops.)

Possible New IED Tactics

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¶18. (C) Loyan noted that the unsuccessful January 7 attack on the Army Chief-of-Staff showed evidence that al-Shabaab is developing new methods of deploying IEDs. In that instance, he said, the IED was attached to the branch of a tree overhanging the road, so that when it detonated downward onto the vehicles below.

Comment

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¶19. (C) Unlike his warlord predecessor "Qeybdiid," Loyan does not bring his own militia to the Mogadishu mix, but he appears to be attempting to systematically address the many problems that handicap the police force he has inherited. The challenges Loyan faces are significant, and he has few resources at his disposal. TFG Minister of Rehabilitation, Demobilization, Re-integration, and Disabilities Mohamed Ali Ibrahim seconded comments we have heard from others here when he told Ambassador Swan in Djibouti on January 9 that Loyan is "competent." Competence alone may not be enough, but it is a start for a government that has been too frequently handicapped by a sorely-needed lack of capacity.

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